Imagine that Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, and that Carol wants to prevent this. Assume there is a communication channel between Alice and Bob, but that Carol is capable of blocking this channel. Furthermore, there is a cost of S dollars to send on the channel, L dollars to listen on the channel and J to block the channel. How much will Alice and Bob need to spend in order to guarantee transmission of m?
INTRODUCTION
In November of 2010, several web hosting and banking companies, including Amazon.com, Visa, Mastercard, and PayPal, severed ties with the website Wikileaks [1] . In retaliation, the Anonymous group of Internet activists launched distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against these companies [1] . Surprisingly, the web pages of both Wikileaks, and all the companies that were attacked by Anonymous emerged relatively unscathed despite the fact that Wikileaks suffered a significant attack on its financial and computational resources, and all parties suffered prolonged and sophisticated DDoS attacks. Some interesting questions arise in light of this incident: Is it fundamentally easier to communicate in largescale networks than it is to block communication? Is it harder to block communication on the Internet compared with wireless networks where denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are easily launched via disruption of the communication medium [32] ? When altercations arise on modern networks, what are the most effective strategies for both sides?
To consider these questions from an algorithmic perspective, we define the following simple problem, which we call the 3-Player Scenario: Alice wishes to guarantee transmission of a message m directly to Bob over a single communication channel. However, there exists an adversary Carol who aims to prevent communication by blocking transmissions over the channel. We consider two cases: (Case 1) when Carol may spoof or even control Bob, which allows her to manipulate an unwitting Alice into incurring excessive sending costs; and (Case 2) where Bob is both correct, unspoofable, and his communications cannot be blocked. Here, "cost" corresponds to a network resource, such as energy in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) or bandwidth in wired networks.
In the 3-Player Scenario, we show that communication is fundamentally cheaper than censorship. Specifically, we describe a protocol that guarantees correct transmission of m, and given that Carol incurs a cost of B, has the following properties. In Case 1, the expected cost to both Alice and Bob is O(B ϕ−1 + 1) where ϕ is the golden ratio. In Case 2, the expected cost to both Alice and Bob is O(B 0.5 + 1). In both cases, Carol's cost asymptotically exceeds the expected cost of either correct player.
In the remainder of this section, we describe our model setup, state our main results and summarize related work. Section 2 includes our full proofs for the 3-Player Scenario. Section 3 addresses jamming adversaries in WSNs and applies our results to the problems of single-hop local broadcast and multi-hop reliable broadcast. Section 4 shows how our results can be employed to mitigate application-level DDoS attacks. We conclude with a discussion of open problems in Section 5.
Model Specification & Assumptions
We describe the model parameters of the 3-Player Scenario.
Las Vegas Property:
Communication of m from Alice to (a correct) Bob must be guaranteed with probability 1; that is, we require a Las Vegas protocol for solving the 3-Player Scenario. An obvious motivation for this Las Vegas property is a critical application, such as an early warning detection system or the dessimination of a crucial security update, where minimizing the probability of failure is paramount. The Las Vegas property has additional merit in multi-hop WSNs for the following reason. Let n be the number of devices within transmitting distance of a device, and let N be the total number of devices in the network. Monte Carlo protocols that succeed with high probability in n are possible. However, typically, n ≪ N and messages will traverse multiple hops; consider Ω(N ) hops. Even if the failure probability for each hop is O(n −c ) for some constant c > 0, or even O(2 −n ), then communication fails along the chain with constant probability. Alternatively, we might achieve protocols that succeed with high probability in N . However, in large networks, N may not be known a priori. Furthermore, a high probability guarantee in N typically involves Ω(log N ) operations which, for large N , may be too costly. Therefore, by devising Las Vegas protocols, we avoid problematic assumptions when n ≪ N .
Channel Utilization: Sending or listening on the communication channel by Alice and Bob is measured in discrete units called slots. For example, in WSNs, a slot may correspond to an actual time slot in a time division multiple access (TDMA) type access control protocol. The cost for sending or listening is S or L per slot, respectively. When Carol blocks a slot, she disrupts the channel such that no communication is possible; blocking costs J per slot. If a slot contains traffic or is blocked, this is detectable by a player who is listening at the receiving end of the channel, but not by the originator of the transmission. For example, a transmission (blocked or otherwise) from Bob to Alice is detectable only by Alice; likewise, a transmission (blocked or otherwise) from Alice to Bob is detectable only by Bob. A player cannot discern whether a blocked slot has disrupted a legitimate message; only the disruption is detectable. For example, high energy noise is detectable over the wireless channel in WSNs, but a receiving device cannot tell if this results from a message collision or a device deliberately disrupting the channel. We let B be the total amount Carol will spend over the course of the algorithm; this value is unknown to either Alice or Bob. Finally, we say that any player is active in a slot if that player is sending, listening or blocking in that slot.
Correct & Faulty Players:
If Alice is faulty, there is clearly no hope of communicating m; therefore, Alice is assumed to be correct. Regarding the correctness of Bob, in Case 1, Carol may spoof or control Bob; in Case 2, communications from Bob are always trustworthy. We emphasize that, in Case 1, Alice is uncertain about whether to trust Bob since he may be faulty. This uncertainty corresponds to scenarios where a trusted dealer attempts to dessiminate content to its neighbors, some of whom may be faulty and attempt to consume resources by requesting numerous retransmissions. Case 2 corresponds to situations where communications sent by Bob are never disrupted and can be trusted; here, the blocking of m is the only obstacle.
Types of Adversary:
Carol has full knowledge of past actions by Alice and Bob. This allows for adaptive attacks whereby Carol may alter her behavior based on observations collected over time. Furthermore, under conditions discussed in Section 2.2, Carol can also be reactive: in any slot, she may detect a transmission and then disrupt the communication (however, she cannot detect when a player is listening). This is pertinent to WSNs where the effectivess of a reactive adversary has been shown experimentally.
Fair & Favorable Protocols
We analyze the cost of our algorithms as a function of B. In this way, we obtain a notion of cost incurred by a player that is relative to the cost incurred by Carol. In devising our algorithms, we seek to achieve two properties with regards to relative cost.
First, our protocol should be fair; that is, Alice and Bob should incur the same worst case asymptotic cost. When network devices have similar resource constraints, such as in WSNs where devices are typically battery powered, this is critical. Alternatively, in networks where a collection of resource-scarce devices (i.e. client machines represented by Alice) occupy one side of the communication channel and a single well-provisioned device (i.e. a server represented by Bob) occupies the other side, the aggregate cost to Alice's side should be roughly equal to that of Bob.
Second, we desire favorable protocols; that is, for B sufficiently large, Alice and Bob both incur asymptotically less expected cost than Carol. DoS attacks are effective because a correct device is always forced to incur a higher cost relative to an attacker. However, if the correct players incur asymptotically less cost than Carol, then Alice and Bob enjoy the advantage, and Carol is faced with the problem of having her resources consumed disproportionately in her attempt to censor communication.
Our Main Contributions
Throughout, let ϕ = (1 + √ 5)/2 denote the golden ratio. We assume that S, L, and J are fixed constants. Our main analytical contributions are listed below. In networks with sufficient traffic, Theorem 1 still holds when Carol is also reactive (Section 2.2). We also prove that any protocol which achieves o(B 0.5 ) expected cost for Bob requires more than 2B slots to terminate (Section 2.3); this lower bound has bearing on the worst-case ω(B) slots required by our protocol.
Our next Theorems 2 & 3 are applications of Case 1 of Theorem 1 to WSNs. We consider a more general setting where Alice wishes to locally (single-hop) broadcast to n neighboring receivers of which any number are spoofed or controlled by Carol. Unfortunately, a naive solution of having each receiver execute a separate instance of our 3-Player Scenario protocol fails to be fair. Thus, we need a different algorithm to achieve the following result. Reliable broadcast in multi-hop WSNs deals with conveying m from one node to all other nodes in the network. We make the standard assumptions that any node p can be heard by the set of neighboring nodes in the topology, N (p) and that, for any p, at most t nodes in N (p) suffer a fault (t-bounded fault model) [5, 6, 19] . We analyze the grid model using the result of Bhandari & Vaidya [6] , and general graphs using the Certified Propagation Protocol (CPA) protocol of Pelc & Peleg [24] . Therefore, against a server defended by our protocol, Carol must incur additional monetary costs in order to procure the number of machines necessary for sustaining the level of attack she would otherwise achieve.
Related Work
Jamming Attacks in WSNs: Several works addressing applied security considerations show that devices in a WSN are vulnerable to adversarial jamming [33] . A number of defenses have been proposed (see [32] ). There are a number of theoretical results on jamming adversaries [34] ; however, none explicitly account for listening costs and there is no notion of favorability. A number of game-theoretic approaches are present in the literature (see [21] ). Gilbert et al. [15] examine the duration for which communication between two players can be disrupted in a model with collision detection in a time-slotted network against an adversary who interferes with an unknown number of transmissions. As we do, the authors assume channel traffic is always detectable at the receiving end (i.e. silence cannot be "forged"). Pelc and Peleg [25] examine an adversary that randomly corrupts messages; we do not require the adversary to behave randomly. Awerbuch et al. [3] give a jamming-resistant MAC protocol in a single-hop network with an adaptive, but non-reactive, adversary. Richa et al [28] significantly extend this work to multi-hop networks. Dolev et al. [10] address a variant of the gossiping problem when multiple channels are jammed. Gilbert et al. [14] derive bounds on the time required for information exchange when a reactive adversary jams multiple channels. Meier et al. [22] examine the delay introduced by a jamming adversary for the problem of node discovery, again in a multichannel setting. Dolev et al. [11] address secure communication using multiple channels with a non-reactive adversary. Recently, Dolev et al. [9] consider wireless synchronization in the presence of a jamming adversary.
Reliable Broadcast: Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied in the grid model [4, 7, 8, 18, 19, 30] . Listening costs are accounted for by King et al. [18, 30] but jamming adversaries are not considered; however, the authors introduce the Bad Santa problem which we use to achieve a lower bound result in Section 2.3. With a reactive jamming adversary, Bhandhari et al. [8] give a reliable broadcast protocol when the amount of jamming is bounded and known a priori; however, correct nodes must expend more energy than the adversary. Progress towards fewer broadcasts is made by Bertier et al. [4] ; however, each node spends significant time in the costly listening state. Alistarh et al. [2] assume collision detection and achieve non-cryptographic authenticated reliable broadcast. They apply their result to the grid model with a reactive jamming adversary; however, nodes incur considerable listening costs.
Wired DDoS Attacks:
Proposals for dealing with DDoS attacks include over-provisioning, throttling techniques, currency schemes, and others (see [31] and references therein). In currency schemes, the server provides service only to a client who pays in some form of currency. In [31] , bandwidth is used as currency and, if the clients' aggregate bandwidth exceeds that of the attackers, then the clients capture server resources. Our work is complementary in that it delineates bounds on the expected bandwidth required in order to guarantee that the correct clients avoid zero throughput. Figure 1 gives the pseudocode for our 3-PLAYER SCENARIO PROTOCOL (3PSP). Each round i ≥ 2 consists of 2 phases and the constant c is determined later. We summarize a round i:
SOLVING THE 3-PLAYER SCENARIO
• Send Phase: In each of the 2 ci slots: Alice sends m with probability 2 2 i for an expected total of 2 (c−1)i+1 slots and Bob listens with probability 2 2 (c−1)i for an expected total of 2 i+1 slots.
• Ack Phase: If Bob has not received m, then Bob sends a request for retransmission, req, for all 2 i slots. Alice listens in each slot with probability 4/2 i (note i ≥ 2) for an expected total 4 slots. We note that Bob need not obey 3PSP if he is controlled by Carol.
Termination Conditions: Termination conditions are important because Carol cannot be allowed to keep the players active in perpetuity while simultaneously forcing them to incur a higher cost. Bob terminates the protocol upon receiving m. Since Alice is not spoofed, as discussed in Section 1.1, this termination condition suf-
3-PLAYER SCENARIO PROTOCOL for round i ≥ 2
Send Phase: For each of the 2 ci slots do • Alice sends m with probability 2/2 i .
• Bob listens with probability 2/2 (c−1)i . If Bob received the message, then Bob terminates.
Ack Phase: For each of the 2 i slots do • Bob sends a req message.
• Alice listens with probability 4/2 i . If Alice listened to a slot in the Ack Phase where no req message or blocking was detected, she terminates. fices. Alice terminates if she listens to a slot in the Ack Phase which is not blocked and does not contain req message; since blocked slots are detectable by Alice (who is on the receiving end of a req message) while listening (Section 1.1), this condition suffices. In other words, Alice continues into the next round if and only if (1) Alice listens to zero slots or (2) all slots listened to by Alice in the Ack Phase contain a blocked slot or req. We highlight the two situations where this condition is met:
• Send Failure: Bob is correct and has not received m.
• Ack Failure: Bob is faulty and sends reqs, or Bob is correct and terminated and Carol either spoofs reqs or blocks slots to trick Alice into thinking a valid req was indeed sent and/or blocked.
Ack Failures and Cases 1 & 2:
Note that an "acknowledgement" occurs via silence in at least one slot in the Ack Phase. We say an Ack Failure occurs when Carol blocks for all slots in the Ack Phase.
In Case 1, an Ack Failure corresponds to a critical attack that can be employed in Ack Phase after the delivery of m. Carol can avoid the listening costs in the Send Phase, and then drain Alice's energy by making it appear that Bob repeatedly did not receive m and is requesting a retransmission in the Ack Phase. This attack affects Alice only. Note that if Bob is actually correct, the attack is only effective once m is received since, if a correct Bob has not received m, a req will be issued anyway.
In Case 2, no blocking occurs in the Ack Phase and, therefore, no Ack Failure can occur. In fact, in Case 2, the Ack Phase can be shortened to a single slot where Bob sends his req and Alice listens; however, this does not change our cost analysis and our current presentation is more general.
Analysis of the 3-Party Scenario Protocol
For a given round, we say it is a send-blocking round if Carol blocks at least half of the slots in the Send Phase; otherwise, it is a non-send-blocking round. Similarly, a ack-blocking round is a round where Carol blocks or spoofs req messages from Bob in at least half the slots in the Ack Phase; otherwise, it is non-ackblocking. Throughout, assume ceilings on the number of active slots of a player if it is not an integer.
Bounds on c:
Clearly, c > 1 or Bob's listening probability in the Send Phase is nonsensical. For Case 1, note that if c ≥ 2, then the expected cost to Alice is at least as much as the expected cost to a potentially faulty/spoofed Bob. If Bob happens to be faulty/spoofed, then the cost to him for an Ack Failure is less than the expected cost to Alice since a faulty/spoofed Bob will simply not listen in the Send Phase; as discussed above, we must avoid this since it admits a draining attack against Alice. Therefore, we have 1 < c < 2. For Case 2, since Bob is guaranteed to be correct, the acceptable range is 1 < c ≤ 2.
LEMMA 1. Consider a non-send-blocking round of 3-PLAYER SCENARIO PROTOCOL. The probability that Bob does not receive the message from Alice is less than
PROOF. Let s = 2 ci be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Let pA be the probability that Alice sends in a particular slot. Let pB be the probability that Bob listens in a particular slot. Let Xj = 1 if the message is not delivered from Alice to Bob in the j th slot.
Let qj = 1 if Carol does not block in slot j; otherwise, let qj = 0. The value of qj can be selected arbitrarily by Carol. Then P r[Xi = 1 | X1X2 · · · Xi−1 = 1] = 1 − pApBqj and substituting for each conditional probability, we have P r[X1X2 · · · Xs
since the round is not send-blocking and so Carol blocks less than s/2 slots.
Note that Lemma 1 handles adaptive (but not reactive) adversaries. A simple but critical feature of tolerating adaptive adversaries is: the probability that a player is active in one slot is independent from the probability that the player is active in another slot. Therefore, knowing that a player was active for k slots in the past conveys no information about future activity. For reactive adversaries, we need only modify Lemma 1 as we do later.
LEMMA 2. Assume that Bob is correct and there are no sendblocking rounds and no ack-blocking rounds. Then, the expected cost of each player is O(S + L) = O(1).
PROOF. Using Lemma 1, the expected cost to Alice is at most
. Similarly, the expected cost to Bob is at most . PROOF. We consider Case 1 and Case 2 with regards to Bob, discussed in Section 1.1. Let i ≥ 2 be the last round which is sendblocking. Let j ≥ i be the last round which is ack-blocking; if no such ack-blocking round exists, then assume j = 0. In Case 1, the total cost to Carol is B = Ω(2 ci +2 j ) since J is a constant. In Case 2, only send-blocking occurs and so B = Ω(2 ci · J) = Ω(2 ci ).
Alice: We first calculate the expected cost to Alice prior to successfully transmitting m. In round i, Carol blocks the channel for at least 2 ci /2 slots. Using Lemma 1, the expected cost to Alice prior to m being delivered is O(
by the bounds on c and given that S and L are constants; note, this is the total cost to Alice for Case 2. Now, using Lemma 3, we calculate the expected cost to Alice after delivery; this addresses ack-blocking rounds possible only in Case 1. By assumption, the last ack-blocking round occurs in round j and therefore Alice's expected cost is O(
by the bounds on c. Therefore, the total expected cost to Alice is
Bob: Finally, assume Bob is correct. Using Lemma 1, his expected cost prior to receiving
) since S and L are constants. Thus, the expected cost for Bob as a function of B is O(B 1/c ).
We now give the proof for Theorem 1 stated in Section 1.3: 
Proof of
Theorem 1: In Case 1, Lemma 4 tells us that the expected cost to Alice and Bob in terms of B is O(B (c−1)/c + B (c−1) ) and O(B 1/c ), respectively. Therefore, the exponents of interest which control the cost to each player are (c − 1)/c, c − 1, and 1/c. The value of c that should be chosen must minimize max{(c − 1)/c, c − 1, 1/c} since we are interested in fair protocols. Given that 1 < c < 2, we have 1/c > (c − 1)/c. Therefore, we solve for c in c − 1 = 1/c, this gives c = (1
Tolerating a Reactive Adversary
Consider a reactive adversary Carol who can detect channel activity without cost, and then block; this ability is possible in WSNs (see Section 3.1). Carol can now detect that m is sent in the Send Phase and block it without fail. To address this powerful adversary, we consider the case where critical data, m, and more often, non-critical data m ′ , is sent over the channel by other participants in addition to Alice and Bob. Carol can detect the traffic; however, she cannot discern whether it is m or m ′ without listening to a portion of the communication (such as packet header information).
In a slot where channel activity is detected, even if Carol listens for a portion of the message, she incurs a substantial cost. Therefore, the cost to Carol is proportional to the number of messages to which she listens. Importantly, in the presence of m ′ , Carol's ability to detect traffic for free is unhelpful since m ′ provides "camouflage" for m. Certainly Carol may block all active slots to prevent transmission of m; however, this is no different than blocking all slots in our original 3-Player Scenario.
This setting corresponds to situations where communication occurs steadily between many participants or via several distributed applications, and Carol wishes to target only a critical few. PROOF. Let x = 2 ci be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Consider the set of slots used by all participants other than Alice. We assume these participants pick their slots at random to send, so that for any slot the probability is 2/3 that the slot is chosen by at least one of them. Since we assume these messages m ′ are sent independently at random, then Chernoff bounds imply that w.h.p., i.e.,
By definition of a non-send-blocking round, Carol listens to or blocks less than x/3 (active) slots. As Carol has no information about the source of a message sent in an active slot until she listens to it, her choice is independent of the source of the message. Given a slot that Alice sends on, there is at least a 1 − (x/3)/y chance it will not be listened to or blocked by Carol. The probability that this slot will not be used by another participant is 1/3 and the probability that Bob will listen to the slot is pB. Hence the probability of a successful transmission from Alice to Bob on a slot which Alice sends on is at least (1 − x/(3y))(1/3)pB = (1 − 1/(2(1 − ǫ)))(1/3)pB ≥ (1/6)pB when y > (1 − ǫ)(2x/3). The probability that all messages that Alice sends fail to be delivered is at most (1 − pB/6) a − 2/x c ′′ where the last term is the probability that y or a is small and c ′′ > 0 is a constant. Redefine pB = 6/((1 − δ)2 (c−1)i ); note that this constant factor increase in the listening probability does not change our asymptotic results and our analysis in Section 2.1 proceeds almost identically. Therefore, we then have
The 3-PLAYER SCENARIO PROTOCOL can be modified so that the initial value of i is large enough to render the error arising from the use of Chernoff bounds sufficiently small; we omit these details. Also, the required level of channel traffic detected by Carol is flexible and different values can be accomodated if the players' probabilities for sending/listening are modified appropriately in the 3-PLAYER SCENARIO PROTOCOL; our results hold asymptotically. We emphasize that Lemma 3 does not require modification. Carol cannot decide to block only when Alice is listening since detecting when a node is listening is impossible. Alternately, Carol cannot silence a req through (reactive) blocking since this is still interpreted as a retransmission request. Using Lemma 5, Theorem 1 follows as before. Finally, we note that the conclusion of our argument aligns with claims put forth in empirical results on reactive jamming in WSNs; that is, such behavior does not necessarily result in a more energy-efficient attack because the adversary must still be listening to the channel for broadcasts prior to committing itself to their disruption [33] .
On Latency & Lower Bounds
King et al. [18, 30] introduced the Bad Santa problem which is described as follows. A child is presented with K boxes, one after another. When presented with each box, the child must immediately decide whether or not to open it. If the child does not to open a box, it can never be revisited. Half the boxes have presents in them, but the decision as to which boxes have presents is made by an adversarial Santa who wants the child to open as many empty boxes as possible. The goal is for the child to obtain a present with probability 1, while opening the smallest expected number of boxes. In [18, 30] , the authors prove a lower bound of Ω(K 0.5 ) on the expected number of opened boxes. PROOF. A lower bound for the 3-Player Scenario is complicated by the possibility that the strategies of Alice and Bob may adapt over time; for example, they may change depending on how Carol blocks. To address this, we assume a more powerful Bob. Specifically, assume that communication of m occurs if Bob is able to find an unblocked time slot in which to listen or to send. Furthermore, assume Bob can tell when he has found such a slot once he listens or sends in that slot. Therefore, such a Bob is at least as powerful as the Bob in the 3-Player Scenario. Now, if Carol has a budget of size B, we ask: Does Bob have a strategy with o(B 0.5 ) expected active slots such that, with probability 1, he finds at least one unblocked slot within 2B slots? Assume that such a strategy exists and consider the Bad Santa problem on 2B boxes. Using Bob's strategy, the child is guaranteed to obtain a present with probability 1 while opening o(B 0.5 ) boxes in expectation. However, this contradicts the Ω(B 0.5 ) lower bound result in [18] and the result follows.
This result illustrates a relationship between the Bad Santa problem and the 3-Player Scenario, and it provides some insight into why our protocol has a worst case latency of ω(B) slots.
JAMMING RESISTANCE IN WSNS
The shared wireless medium of sensor networks renders them vulnerable to jamming attacks. A jamming attack occurs when an attacker transmits noise at high energy, possibly concurrently with a (legitimate) transmission, such that communication is disrupted within the area of interference. Consequently, this behavior threatens the availability of sensor networks.
Rationale for the 3-Player Scenario
Wireless network cards offer states such as sleep, receive (or listen) and transmit (or send). While the sleep state requires negligible power, the cost of the send and listen states are roughly equivalent and dominate the operating cost of a device. For example, the send and listen costs for the Telos motes are 38mW and 35mW, respectively (note S ≈ L) and the sleep state cost is 15µW [26] ; therefore, the cost of the send/listen state is more than a factor of 2000 greater and the sleep state cost is negligible. Disruption may not require jamming an entire slot so we set J < S and assume a small m such that J and S are within a constant factor of each other; larger messages can be sent piecewise. In our protocols, we account for both send and receive costs. Throughout, when a node is not active, we assume it is in the energy-efficient sleep state.
Slots:
There is a single channel and a time division multiple access (TDMA)-like medium access control (MAC) protocol; that is, a time-slotted network. For example, the well-known LEACH [16] protocol is TDMA-based. For simplicity, a global broadcast schedule is assumed; however, this is likely avoidable if nodes maintain multiple schedules. Even then, global scheduling has been demonstrated by experimental work in [20] .
A blocked slot occurs when Carol jams. Clear channel assessment (CCA), which subsumes carrier sensing, is a common feature on devices for detecting such events [27] . Collisions are only detectable by the receiver. When a collision occurs, a correct node discards any received data. The absence of channel activity cannot be forged; this aligns with the empirical work by Niculescu [23] who shows that channel interference increases linearly with the combined rate of the sources. Finally, we also note that several theoretical models feature collision detection (see [2, 3, 8, 15, 28] ).
On Reactive Adversaries: CCA is performed via the radio chip using the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). If the RSSI value is below a clear channel threshold, then the channel is assumed to be clear. Such detection consumes on the order of 10
W which is three orders of magnitude smaller than the send/listen costs; therefore, Carol can detect activity (but not message content) at essentially zero-cost. Listening to even a small portion of a message costs on the order of milliwatts and our argument from Section 2.2 now applies.
Cryptographic Authentication: We assume that messages can be authenticated. Therefore, Carol cannot spoof Alice; however, Bob's req can essentially be spoofed by an Ack-Failure (as discussed in Section 2) which, along with jamming, makes the problem non-trivial. Several results show how light-weight cryptographic authentication can be implemented in sensor networks(see [12] ); therefore, it is important to consider its impact as we do here. However, the adversary may capture a limited number of players (such as Bob in the 3-Player Scenario); these players are said to suffer a Byzantine fault and are controlled by the adversary. Given this attack, we emphasize that, while we assume a shared key to achieve authentication, attempts to share a secret send/listen schedule between Alice and Bob allows Carol to manipulate players in ways that are problematic.
Local Broadcast & Guaranteed Latency
Our protocol LOCAL BROADCAST handles the general singlehop broadcast situation where Alice sends m to n neighboring receivers within her transmission range. At first glance, this seems achievable by having each receiver execute an instance of 3PSP with Alice. However, the expected active time for Alice is an Ω(n)-factor larger than any correct receiver; thus, this is unfair. Furthermore, this protocol has poor latency. Here, we give a fast protocol that is both fair and favorable up to small polylogarithmic factors.
Our pseudocode is given in Figure 2 . The probabilities for sending and listening are modified and there are two more phases (the Deterministic Send and Deterministic Ack Phases) where players act deterministically. Note that req messages can collide in the Probabilistic Ack Phase and will certainly collide in the Deterministic Ack Phase. This is correct as such a collision is due to either jamming or multiple receivers (correct or faulty) requesting a retransmission; this is fine and Alice will resend. LOCAL BROAD-CAST takes in as arguments the message m, the sender (Alice) and the set of receivers R Alice . If the adversary jams, then none of the correct receivers receive m in that slot.
An important property of LOCAL BROADCAST is that there is a guaranteed bound on the latency. This is useful for achieving reliable broadcast in multi-hop networks in the next section. • Each receiver that has not terminated listens. Any receiver that receives m terminates the protocol.
Probabilistic Ack Phase: For each of the 2 i slots do • Each receiver that has not terminated sends req.
• Alice listens with probability 4 ln n 2 i . Deterministic Ack Phase: For each of the 2 (ϕ−1)i+1 slots do • Each reciever that has not received m sends req.
• Alice listens. If Alice listened in either a Probabilistic Ack Phase or a Deterministic Ack Phase and detected no req message or collision then she terminates the algorithm. PROOF. The deterministic phases play a key role in establishing the bound on latency. If the adversary is not active for all slots in the deterministic Send Phase, then all correct receivers obtain m. Once all correct receivers terminate, the adversary must be active in all slots of the deterministic Ack Phase in order to prevent Alice from terminating. Therefore, prior to successful termination of all correct players (including Alice), the adversary is active for at least
we seek the number of rounds ρ such that ρ i=d 2 (ϕ−1)i+1 ≥ B which yields that ρ ≥ ϕ lg(B + 2 ϕ−1 ln ϕ−1 n) rounds suffices to exhaust the adversary (we are not being exact). Each round i has at most 4 · 2 ϕ·i+1 slots so ρ ≤ 25 · (B + ln ϕ−1 n) ϕ+1 slots.
LEMMA 7. Assume that Carol's receivers are active for a total of B slots. Then, LOCAL BROADCAST guarantees communication of m to all correct nodes and has the following properties:
• The expected cost to Alice is O(B ϕ−1 ln n + ln ϕ n). Therefore, for B = ω(ln ϕ+1 n), Alice spends asymptotically less than Carol.
• The expected cost to any correct receiver is O(B ϕ−1 +ln n). Therefore, for B = ω(ln n), Bob spends asymptotically less than Carol.
The value n is the number of devices within the broadcast range of Alice. For a determined adversary, we expect B > n; that is, for an adversary intent on preventing communication, the number of time slots jammed will likely exceed the number of neighbors. Therefore, B ≫ ln ϕ+1 n. In this case (actually for B ≥ ln ϕ−1 n), the latency is O(B ϕ+1 ) and, noting that Carol can prevent transmission for at least B slots, this is within an O(B ϕ )-factor of the optimal latency. By this and Lemmas 6 & 7, Theorem 2 follows.
Mitigating Unfavorable Listening Costs
Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied in the multihop grid model [5-7, 19, 30] , particularly with a jamming adversary [2, 4, 8] . Reliable broadcast is possible when t Byzantine nodes can each corrupt at most nc transmissions [8] . Unfortunately, the protocol of [8] , and the improvement by [4] , requires that correct nodes possess much more energy than the Byzantine nodes. In particular, while the sending costs are improved in [4] , both [4, 8] [2] are similar). In contrast, each Byzantine node is active for nc. This Ω(t)-factor advantage affords the adversary a DDoS attack since these previous protocols are unfavorable.
Setup:
Here, each node p(x, y) is situated at (x, y) in a grid. The dealer d is located at (0, 0) and seeks to propagate m to all correct nodes in the network. When a node p sends a message, all listening nodes in N (p) receive the message (analogous results will hold for the Euclidean metric [6] ). There are t < (r/2)(2r + 1) Byzantine nodes in any neighborhood. For any correct node p, the adversary can use its t Byzantine nodes in N (p) to jam for up to B0 = t · nc slots total. There is a global schedule (obeyed by the correct nodes) that assigns each node a slot for broadcasting.
Unlike the single-hop case, here the amount of jamming in a neighborhood is upper bounded by B0 and known. This is required in [4, 8] and a similar assumption is made in [3, 28] . B0 represents the number of times a Byzantine node can deviate from the global schedule within some time frame before being identified and subjected to defensive techniques (see [32] ). Not exceeding B0 in each time frame allows the adversary to attack throughout the lifetime of the network and we pessimistically assume that B0 is large so that the adversary may inflict sustained attacks.
We incorporate LOCAL BROADCAST into the protocol of Bhandari & Vaidya [6] to achieve the first favorable reliable broadcast protocol. The hard latency bound of LOCAL BROADCAST is crucial for establishing when nodes send and listen in order to propagate m. Due to space constraints, we defer our protocol to a complete version of the paper; however, we can show the following: • If β = O(r 2 ln ϕ+1 r), then the expected cost to each each correct node is O(r 2 ln ϕ+2 r).
• If β = ω(r 2 ln ϕ+1 r), then the protocol is fair and the expected cost to each correct node is O(r 2(2−ϕ) β ϕ−1 ln r+ r 2 ln ϕ r) = o(β); that is, the expected cost to each correct node is asymptotically less than that incurred by Carol.
For ease of exposition, our result applies to a single corridor; however, this is sufficient to prove reliable broadcast in the entire network since the grid can be covered piecewise by such corridors.
Reliable Broadcast for General Topologies
In this section, we apply our results to reliable broadcast in an arbitrary graph G = (V, E). Pelc & Peleg [24] examine the broadcast protocol of Koo [19] , which the authors call the Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA), with the aim of establishing conditions for which it achieves reliable broadcast on general graphs. Again, CPA addresses the case where all nodes obey a global broadcast schedule (i.e. there is no jamming adversary). The authors define X(p, d) to be the number of nodes in p's neighborhood N (p) that are closer to d than p and then introduce the parameter
∈ E}. One of their main results is that, for any graph G with dealer d such that t < X(G)/2, CPA achieves reliable broadcast; although, it does not always achieve optimal fault tolerance. For example, CPA cannot tolerate the optimal number of faults in the grid; however, we address CPA because its generality is powerful.
FAVORABLE CPA
• The dealer d sends the message to all of its neighbors using LOCAL BROADCAST(m, d, N (d)) starting in cycle 1 and terminating after at most D cycles.
• If node u ∈ N (d), then upon receiving m from d via LO-CAL BROADCAST(m, d, N (d)), it accepts m as correct, announces this committment to its neighbors in cycle D + 1, and terminates.
• If node p / ∈ N (d), then p listens to each neighbor q ∈ X(p) via LOCAL BROADCAST(m, q, N (q)) starting in cycle sq · D + 1 and ending by (sq + 1) · D; otherwise, p sleeps. Upon receiving t+1 copies of m from t+1 distinct neighbors in X(p), p accepts m as correct, announces this committment to its neighbors using LOCAL BROADCAST(m, p, N (p)) in broadcast cycle sp·D+1, and terminates by cycle (sp+1)·D. 
A Favorable Protocol in General Topologies
For each node p, define X(p) to be those X(p, d) nodes closer to the dealer than p. We assume each node knows the full network topology and the location of the dealer (i.e. preprogrammed before deployment, or learned robustly after deployment). Call a single iteration of the global broadcast schedule a cycle. Time is measured from when the dealer first broadcasts m in cycle 1. Under CPA, regardless of the worst case delay imposed by the adversary, there is a cycle where p must have received at least t + 1 copies of m from distinct correct nodes in X(p) allowing p to commit to m; denote this cycle by sp. In any execution of reliable broadcast, p may actually be able to commit prior to sp, but sp is the maximum cycle by which p is guaranteed the information it needs to commit to m regardless of how the adversarial nodes behave.
Each node p can calculate sp. This is done by simulating the propagation of m using CPA. In this simulation, each node p has the maximum t = X(G)/2 − 1 Byzantine nodes in X(p) and these Byzantine nodes send their faulty messages prior to the t + 1 correct responses in order delay propagation of m for as long as possible. By assuming that every X(p) has the maximum number of Byzantine nodes, the actual placement of the Byzantine nodes in G does not affect the worst case broadcast time sp. In tracing this propagation, any node can calculate sp for any node p.
Consider the following minor modifications to CPA: each correct node p (1) only listens to q ∈ X(p) in cycle sq + 1, and (2) only sends its commit message in cycle sp + 1. In all other slots, p is sleeping; call this protocol CPA0. These minor changes synchronize the sending/listening and allow nodes to otherwise sleep instead of perpetually listening. The following lemma is clear: LEMMA 9. If CPA achieves reliable broadcast, then CPA0 achieves reliable broadcast.
Each node requires knowledge of the full network topology and the location of the dealer. Clearly, it is possible to identify X(p). In Figure 3 , we provide pseudocode for a fair and favorable reliable broadcast algorithm FAVORABLE CPA, abbreviated FCPA, that tolerates the jamming adversary described in Theorem 3; here, D = 25 · (B0 + ln ϕ−1 n) ϕ .
LEMMA 10. Assume CPA achieves reliable broadcast on a graph G. Then, FCPA guarantees reliable broadcast on G.
PROOF. Using FCPA, we claim that every correct node can commit by cycle sp · D. To prove this, assume the opposite: that some node p does not commit to the correct message m by cycle sp · D. Then, there is some correct node q ∈ X(p) that: (1) could not commit to m by time slot sq · D (and could not send p a committment message), or (2) committed to a wrong message (and sent a wrong message to p). The time for any node u to send its commit message to v is at most D cycles by Lemma 6. Therefore, if q cannot commit by cycle sq · D in FCPA, then q cannot commit by cycle sq in CPA0; therefore, CPA0 fails to achieve reliable broadcast. Similarly, if q commits to the wrong message in FCPA, then it would also commit to the wrong message in CPA0 , and so CPA0 fails. However, if CPA0 fails to achieve reliable broadcast, then by the contrapositive of Lemma 9, this contradicts the assumption that CPA achieves reliable broadcast.
Combining Lemma 10 with the cost analysis below yields the results stated in Theorem 3 for general graphs.
Theorem 3 -Cost Analysis:
In both of our protocols, each correct node p partakes in an execution of LOCAL BROADCAST O(t) times as a sender and receiver; let k denote the total number of such executions. For the i th such execution, let τi be the number of slots for which the adversary is active for i = 1, ..., k. Denote Carol's total active time by β = k i=1 τi ≤ B0. Consider two cases:
Case II:
. By a corollary of Jensen's inequality for concave functions, for a concave func-
is concave, it follows that
Therefore, the total expected cost to p over
. Therefore, p's expected cost is less than Carol's. Substituting t = O(r 2 ) into the above analysis yields the favorability result above in Lemma 8 and, together, gives our result for the grid model in Theorem 3.
APPLICATION-LEVEL DDOS ATTACKS
Typically in application-level DDoS attacks, a number of compromised clients, known collectively as a botnet, are employed to overwhelm a server with requests. These botnets have become commercialized with botmasters renting out time to individuals for the purposes of launching attacks. We assume a model of botnet attacks similar to that described by Walfish et al. [31] . Here, a request is cheap for a client to issue, expensive for the server to service, and all requests incur the same computational cost. There is a high-capacity communication channel and the crucial bottleneck is the server's inability to process a heavy request load.
The client rate is g requests per second. The aggregate botnet rate is R requests per second and this is assumed to be both relatively constant and the botnet's maximum possible rate. If the server is overloaded, it randomly drops excess requests. In this case, the good clients only receive a fraction g/(g + R) of the servers resources; it is assumed that R ≫ g so that g/(g + R) is very small.
Walfish et al. [31] propose a protocol SPEAK-UP for resisting DDoS attacks by having clients increase their sending rate such that their aggregate bandwidth G is on the same order as that of R. Since botnet machines are assumed to have already "maxedout" their available bandwidth in attacking, SPEAK-UP greatly in-creases the chance that the server processes a legitimate request since G/(G + R) ≫ g/(g + R). A crucial component of SPEAK-UP is a front-end to the server called the "thinner" which controls which requests are seen by the server and asks a client to retry her request if it was previously dropped.
Our Speak-Up-Like Protocol
We employ Case 2 of our 3-Player Scenario to achieve a SPEAK-UP-like algorithm with provable guarantees. Bandwidth (upstream and downstream rates in bits per second) is our measure of cost and our results should be interpreted as quantifying the expected upstream bandwidth required by the client and the expected downstream bandwidth with which the server should be provisioned.
The client plays the role of Alice where the message is a request; the server plays the role of Bob. This application falls into Case 2 of Theorem 1: a DDoS attack targets the server while communications from the server to the clients are not disrupted. The client and server are assumed to be synchronized such that they always agree on the current round and a maximum round number is set a priori. Such synchronization is possible over Internet-connected machines and the maximum round value should be set to account for the level of DDoS resistance the participants wish to have; for most attacks, R is in the low hundreds of Mbits/second [29] . We give an overview of our protocol.
Send Phase: Each Send Phase occurs over a uniform and fixed duration ∆; for simplicity, we set ∆ = 1 second, and the slot length changes in each round appropriately. The client sends in each slot with probability 2/2 i with an expected 2 i upstream bits per second. The server listens in each slot with probability 2/2 i for an expected 2 i downstream bits per second. If the received traffic substantially exceeds 2 i , requests are dropped; probabilistic listening and traffic measurement on the server side can be performed by the thinner.
Note that in each round, the client increases her sending rate in the Send Phase to "speak up". A correct client that reaches its bandwidth limit remains at this limit for the remainder of the protocol. When the maximum round number is reached, the clients maintain their sending rate until the thinner informs them that the attack has ended. We define a blocked slot as one where Carol overwhelms the server with requests and the client's request is dropped in that slot. Define a send-blocked phase as one where Carol blocks at least 2 2i /2 slots; therefore, Carol uses an upstream bandwidth of at least 2 2i /2 bits per second. As in [31] , if the thinner drops a request, it immediately asks the client to retry in the next round.
Ack Phase: The server does not increase its sending rate per round (only the client speaks up) since there are no attacks in the Ack Phase for Case 2. This simplifies the Ack Phase as mentioned in Section 2 in our discussion of Ack Failures; the server simply returns the requested data to the client at some reasonable rate.
The constants S = J and L correspond to the rate of 1 bit per second. We assume upstream and downstream bandwidth are capped; this is true of residential Internet packages, as well as hosted services. In the case of residential service, upstream bandwidth is scarcer than downstream bandwidth, while servers are generally well-provisioned for both; this can be reflected in our cost constants. By Case 2 of Theorem 1 we have: Bob can represent multiple good clients. Again, synchronization with the server is assumed; clients joining at different times are informed by the thinner of the current round. In order to be guaranteed some of the server's resources, the clients' expected aggregate bandwidth is G = Ω(R 0.5 ). Therefore, our result quantifies the minimum expected aggregate upstream bandwidth for clients and the expected downstream bandwidth for the server required to ensure that total censorship is averted; in contrast, SPEAK-UP cannot make such a guarantee. This is useful for applications where a critical update or warning must be dessiminated, and delivery to even a handful of clients is sufficient since they may share it with others (via multicast, peer-to-peer distribution, etc.).
As with SPEAK-UP, the probability of a legitimate request being serviced is still G/(G + R). In addition to admitting an analysis, our iterative approach of geometrically increasing the aggregrate bandwidth should mitigate attempts by Carol at launching short duration DDoS attacks in order to provoke a steep and disruptive traffic increase from correct clients. Our protocol is fair as described in Section 1.2 -the aggregate requirement of the bandwidth constrained clients is asymptotically equal to that of the wellprovisioned server. Restating our result above in the context of multiple clients yields Theorem 4.
Finally, in order to achieve the same level of denial-of-service against a server that is defended by our protocol, Carol must procure a much larger botnet in order to obtain the necessary bandwidth; however, this comes at a cost. For example, one study found the cost of a single bot to be between $2 and $25 [13] . Therefore, since Carol's bandwidth requirements increase quadratically, her monetary costs increase significantly with the use of our protocol.
CONCLUSION
We have examined an abstract model of conflict over a communication channel. In the 3-Player Scenario, we remark that there is an O(1) up-front cost per execution of our protocol when there are no send-or ack-blocking attacks. Similarly, there are small up-front costs for our other favorable protocols. This is the (tolerable) price for communication in the presence of a powerful adversary, even if that adversary is not necessarily very active. The golden ratio arises naturally from our analysis, and its appearance in this adversarial setting is interesting; an important open question is whether Ω(B ϕ−1 + 1) cost is necessary. Also of interest is determining whether there are fair and favorable algorithms for other types of problems. An interesting starting point would be the problem of conflict over dissemination of an idea in a social network, using the models of Kempe et al. [17] .
